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THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE

I N T R OD U C T I ON

The fighting words exception to the First Amendment has a long vintage.1 The
U.S. Supreme Court created the doctrine nearly eighty years ago in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.2 The Court famously defined fighting words as words “which by their
very utterance inflict injury or [cause] an immediate breach of the peace.” 3 The
Court applied the concept to uphold the breach-of-the-peace conviction of a
Rochester, New Hampshire-based Jehovah’s Witness, Walter Chaplinsky, who
allegedly cursed a local marshal.4 The New Hampshire breach-of-the-peace statute
was quite broad, stating that “no person shall address any offensive, derisive, or
annoying word to any other person . . . .”5 However, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court interpreted the statute to apply only to fighting words — the first time an
appeals court had ever used the term “fighting words.”6 The U.S. Supreme Court
accepted this narrow construction and famously declared:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.7

Since Chaplinsky, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently invalidated
convictions in subsequent fighting words decisions. Most famously, the Court
ruled that Paul Robert Cohen did not engage in fighting words when he wore a
jacket to a Los Angeles County Courthouse bearing the words “Fuck the Draft.”8 The
Court explained that the jacket with the profane word was not a “direct personal
insult.”9 The Court also noted that there was “no showing that anyone who saw

1

David L. Hudson, Jr., Fighting Words Case Still Making Waves in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
Freedom F. Inst., Mar. 9, 2012, https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2012/03/09/fightingwords-case-still-making-waves-in-first-amendment-jurisprudence/ [https://perma.cc/8BNS343Z].

2

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

3

Id. at 572.

4

Id. at 569, 574.

5

Id. at 569.

6

David L. Hudson, Jr., Fighting Words, in Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom
of Speech § 3:6 (2012).

7

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.

8

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).

9

Id. at 20.

3

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:1 (2020)

Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that [Cohen] intended such a result.”10
A few years later, the Court in Lewis v. New Orleans11 reversed the conviction of a
New Orleans woman who had cursed at police officers for arresting her son. She
was charged with violating an ordinance prohibiting the use of “obscene or
opprobrious language” toward police officers.12 The Court deemed the ordinance
unconstitutionally overbroad.13 In a concurring opinion, Justice Lewis Powell wrote
that “a properly trained police officer may reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a
higher degree of restraint’ than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to
respond belligerently to ‘fighting words.’”14
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in City of Houston v. Hill,15 a case
involving a man who was arrested for protesting the arrest of a friend. The police
arrested the individual for violating a city ordinance that prohibited individuals
from interfering with officers’ official duties.16 After being acquitted in municipal
court, the man filed a civil rights lawsuit against the city.17 The city argued that the
ordinance prohibited “core criminal conduct.”18
The High Court disagreed with Justice William Brennan, famously writing:
“The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without
thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish
a free nation from a police state.” 19 The Court concluded that the Houston
ordinance “criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech,
and accords the police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement.”20
A couple years later, the Supreme Court also rejected the idea that a Texas flag
desecration law could be justified under the fighting words doctrine in Texas v.
Johnson.21 The five-member majority emphasized that Gregory Lee Johnson did not
engage in fighting words when he burned an American flag in connection with the
10

Id.

11

Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).

12

Id. at 132.

13

Id. at 131-32.

14

Id. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring).

15

City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 453-54 (1987).

16

Id. at 454-55.

17

Id. at 455.

18

Id. at 469.

19

Id. at 462-63.

20

Id. at 466.

21

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
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Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas. 22 Texas officials argued that
burning the flag constituted fighting words.23 But Justice Brennan wrote that “[n]o
reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal
insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.”24
A few years later, the Court invalidated the conviction of a juvenile who was
prosecuted for burning a cross in the yard of a neighboring African-American
family. 25 The law prohibited burning crosses or other hate symbols “which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”26
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the law, reasoning that it applied only to
fighting words. 27 However, the U.S. Supreme Court—in an opinion by Justice
Antonin Scalia—reasoned that the state committed viewpoint discrimination by
choosing to punish only certain types of fighting words.28
The fighting words doctrine has always been controversial, as it allows for the
punishment of individuals for engaging in offensive, obnoxious, and repugnant
expression.29 The doctrine has been vigorously criticized. Professor Burton Caine
termed it a “tragedy for the jurisprudence of Freedom of Speech.”30 Many other
scholars have questioned the vitality of the doctrine, frequently noting that postChaplinsky the Court has never sustained a conviction in a fighting words case.31
22

Id.

23

Id. at 407-08.

24

Id. at 409.

25

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992).

26

Id. at 380.

27

Id. at 380-81.

28

Id. at 391.

29

David L. Hudson, Jr., Connecticut High Court Reverses Woman’s Conviction for Profanity Uttered
at Store, Freedom F. Inst., July 27, 2017, https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2017/07/26/
connecticut-high-court-reverses-womans-conviction-for-profanity-uttered-at-store/
[https://perma.cc/GC3Z-JUV3] (noting that “[t]he fighting words doctrine is a controversial
aspect of free-speech jurisprudence, because it allows for the punishment of individuals for
intemperate, offensive speech.”).

30

Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is a Threat to First
Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 441, 443 (2004).

31

Erwin Chemerinsky & Howard Gillman, Free Speech on Campus 40 (2017) (noting that
the U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t sustained a fighting words conviction in more than seventy years);
Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Free Speech Clause with a Five-Step
Analytical Framework, 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 223, 256 (2000) (“Chaplinsky is the first and last decision in
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But the fighting words doctrine is alive and well in the lower courts.32 The first
part of this article briefly has explained how the fighting words doctrine fared in the
U.S. Supreme Court. These results would seem to indicate that it would be rare
indeed for a defendant’s words to fall under the fighting words exception. That is
not always the case. The next part of this article provides a sampling of decisions in
which lower courts have rejected First Amendment-based defenses to disorderly
conduct, breach of the peace, or similar charges based on the fighting words
doctrine. The final part of the essay then explains the specific factors or facts that
cause lower courts to find that certain expression constitutes unprotected fighting
words rather than protected speech.
I.

L O WE R C O U R T C A S E S F I N D I N G T H A T S P E E C H C O N S T I T U T E S
F I G H T I N G WOR D S

A. State v. Harvey33
In November 1998, a special response team with the Marion, Ohio Police
Department executed an arrest warrant on an individual. 34 When the police
emerged from the home with the individual arrested, a neighbor, Marcus G. Harvey,
came out to the scene and began shouting at the arresting officers.35 He yelled “F
you guys,” “Let me see an F’ing search warrant,” “This is a declaration of war,” and
“This means war.” 36 The police then arrested Harvey who had his hands in his
pocket.37 Harvey had his hands on his key fob and refused to let go.38 The officers
which the Supreme Court has ever affirmed a fighting words conviction.”); Linda Friedlieb,
Comment, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 385, 389 (2005) (noting that the “Supreme Court has never affirmed another fighting words
conviction”); Aviva O. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and
Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting Words Jurisprudence, 63 Fordham L. Rev.
793, 795 (1994) (“Yet, in the half century following the Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine,
no convictions in cases in which a defendant was prosecuted under a fighting words statute have
been upheld.”).
32

Chris Demaske, Social Justice, Recognition Theory and the First Amendment: A New Approach to
Hate Speech Restriction, 24 Comm. L. & Pol’y 347, 368 n.102 (“While the Supreme Court has moved
away from the fighting words doctrine, it continues to be used vigorously by the lower courts.”).

33

State v. Harvey, No. 9-19-34, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 283, at *1 (Feb. 3, 2020).

34

Id.

35

Id. at *2.

36

Id.

37

Id. at *2-3.

38

Id. at *3-4.
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eventually tased Harvey and took him into custody.39
A “jury found Harvey guilty of one count of resisting arrest and one count of
persistent disorderly conduct.”40 On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his
convictions.41 With regard to the persistent disorderly conduct charge, the appeals
court analyzed whether Harvey had engaged in fighting words.42 The appeals court
noted that a key factor in such cases was whether the defendant engaged in “hostile
or threatening” conduct when making the profane statements.43 Another key factor
noted by the appeals court was whether the defendant continued uttering profane
statements after being ordered to stop.44
The appeals court emphasized that Harvey’s conduct was crucial to the decision
to arrest him: “The testimony of the police officers indicates that Harvey’s conduct
alongside his profane utterances and aggressive demeanor were the impetus for the
police to arrest him for disorderly conduct.”45 The appeals court also focused on the
fact that “Harvey approached the police in an aggressive and agitated manner.”46
Ultimately, the appeals court concluded that Harvey’s statements constituted
fighting words and affirmed his conviction.47
B. State v. Hale48
In October 2016, Jason Hale and his wife entered a gas station in Oak Harbor,
Ottawa County, Ohio. 49 Hale was employed by the Ottawa County Sheriff’s
Department.50 Hale encountered Officer Eric Parker and Sergeant Joshua Couts
who were employed by the Oak Harbor Police Department.51 Hale allegedly yelled
“Fuck you, Parker” at Officer Parker and then yelled “Suck my dick, Parker” as he

39

Id. at *4.

40

Id. at *5.

41

Id. at *1.

42

Id. at *19.

43

Id. at *10.

44

Id. at *10-11.

45

Id. at *13.

46

Id. at *18.

47

Id. at *19.

48

State v. Hale, No. OT-17-023, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1576, at *1 (April 13, 2018).

49

Id. at *1-2.

50

Id. at *2.

51

Id. at *1-2.
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came near the cashier.52 Hale then yelled “you’re a coward” at Parker as he left the
store.53
At the time that Hale yelled these profanities, there were women with small
children in the convenience store.54 A store employee testified that Hale was “very
loud” and that it unnerved her.55 Hale was later charged with disorderly conduct.56
Following a bench trial, the court found Hale guilty.57
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.58 The appeals
court noted that Hale repeatedly directed “obscene remarks” at Officer Parker in a
manner that was “provoking.”59 The court noted that the words “would reasonably
incite the average person to retaliate.”60
C. State v. Krueger61
Defendant Chad Harold Krueger was sitting at a bar when he saw his sister-inlaw, with whom he had an acrimonious relationship.62 He told his friend that his
sister-in-law was a “f-cking c-nt.”63 He then began to scream various profanities at
her over and over.64 The sister-in-law left the bar; but Krueger continued to shout
at her, telling her she “was so f-cking stupid that he couldn’t even believe [she] was
alive.”65 A police officer approached and Krueger continued yelling at his sister-inlaw.66
The officer arrested Krueger for disorderly conduct, and a jury later found him
guilty.67 On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that several
52

Id. at *2-3.

53

Id. at *3.

54

Id. at *4.

55

Id. at *4-5.

56

Id. at *1.

57

Id. at *5.

58

Id. at *1.

59

Id. at *8.

60

Id. at *8-9.

61

State v. Krueger, A17-s0081, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1047, at *1 (Dec. 18, 2017).

62

Id.

63

Id. at *1-2.

64

Id. at *2.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id. at *2, *7.
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witnesses testified to Krueger’s profane and loud statements to his sister-in-law.68
The court concluded, “Krueger’s statements were likely to provoke violence for
several reasons: his extreme volume and vulgarity, he leaned in toward [the sisterin-law] as he spoke, and he followed [her] outside of the bar and continued to yell
vulgar and taunting remarks.”69
D. State v. Nelson70
Jeffrey Kevin Nelson entered a liquor store and had a heated verbal
confrontation with the store clerk working behind the cash register.71 Nelson, who
had prior altercations with the clerk and the clerk’s wife, called the clerk a “f--king
a--hole” and a “piece of sh-t” in the presence of about ten to fifteen customers.72 The
clerk told Nelson to leave, but Nelson continued to curse and refused to leave.73
A police sergeant received a report of a “customer harassing an employee or
causing a disturbance at the liquor store.” 74 The officer arrested Nelson for
disorderly conduct and a trial court found Nelson guilty.75
On appeal, Nelson argued that the fighting words doctrine was “archaic” and
that his speech was protected by the First Amendment.76 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, writing that “[t]he ‘fighting words’ category of
unprotected speech remains good law and is appropriate for application in this
case.”77
The appeals court determined that Nelson’s profanities at the store clerk were
the type of face-to-face personal insults that fall within the ambit of the fighting
words doctrine.78 The appeals court explained: “A store clerk at his place of work
should not be expected to tolerate the same level of abuse as a trained police officer
who often deals with intoxicated or mentally ill persons.”79
68

Id. at *1, *16-17.

69

Id. at *18.

70

State v. Nelson, No. A14-0356, 2014 Minn. App. LEXIS 1305 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014).

71

Id. at *1–2.

72

Id. at *1–2.

73

Id. at *2.

74

Id. at *3.

75

See id. at *3.

76

Id. at *4–5.

77

Id. at *5.

78

Id. at *7–8.

79

Id. at *9–10.
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E. In Re J.K.P.80
The Kansas Court of Appeals upheld a juvenile court’s finding of delinquency
for disorderly conduct when a juvenile yelled the N-word at another juvenile.81 The
court noted that the recipient of the communication was offended by the use of the
racial slur.82 The court also quoted the North Carolina Supreme Court’s following
language: “No fact is more generally known than that a white man who calls a black
man a ‘nigger’ within his hearing will hurt and anger the black man, and often
provoke him to confront the white man and retaliate.”83
F. Rebel v. Rebel84
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a couple engaged in
disorderly conduct when they approached the husband’s former spouse and used
vulgar and abusive language.85 Jesse and Brandi Rebel, a married couple, were upset
at Jesse’s former spouse, Wendy Rebel.86 They believed that Wendy lied about Jesse
being the father of her two children.87
Jesse and Brandi Rebel approached Wendy Rebel in her car and began shouting
at her. 88 Brandi called Wendy a “fucking liar” and told her “she was not brave
enough to get out of the car.”89 Brandi later posted on Facebook that Wendy was
“shaking so bad I thought she was having a seizure and I’m positive she pissed
herself!”90
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a disorderly conduct restraining
order against Jesse and Brandi, who argued that their speech was constitutionally
protected.91 The state high court disagreed, writing that the district court did not
err in finding that “Wendy Rebel’s safety, security, and privacy were compromised

80

In re J.K.P., No. 108,617, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS 185 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2013).

81

Id. at *5–6, 13.

82

Id. at *8.

83

Id. at *8–9 (quoting In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 699 (N.C.1997)).

84

Rebel v. Rebel, 837 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 2013).

85

Id. at 353.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 356.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 359.
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by the Rebels’ threatening actions and that the language used to get her out of the
vehicle constituted ‘fighting words’ with no legitimate First Amendment purpose.92
G. In Re H.K.93
Juvenile H.K. and two others followed T.K., an African-American girl, into a
bathroom at a teen center in Valley City, North Dakota.94 H.K. started yelling at T.K.
and called her a “nigger” on multiple occasions.95 H.K. allegedly told T.K. she better
watch out because she did not want her kind in this town.96 After this incident, T.K.
also ran into H.K. at a local restaurant where H.K. once again referred to her by the
same racial slur.97
Authorities charged H.K. with disorderly conduct.98 Her attorney argued that
the state was attempting to criminalize the use of the racial slur.99 The juvenile
court adjudicated H.K. delinquent.100 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed.101 The court noted that H.K. did more than utter a single racial epithet but
“repeatedly” uttered the racial slur. 102 The court reasoned that “an objectively
reasonable person would find the totality of H.K.’s statements constituted explicit
and implicit threats that were likely to incite a breach of the peace or violent reaction
and alarm the listener.”103
H. McCormick v. City of Lawrence104
A federal district court in Kansas determined that two individuals who filmed
police activity at traffic stops and yelled at officers during those stops uttered

92

Id.

93

Cruff v. H.K. (In re H.K.), 778 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 2010).

94

Id. at 767.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 770.

103

Id.

104

McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Kan. 2004).
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fighting words.105 In one instance, the police conducted a traffic stop of a driver.106
The plaintiff filmed the police at a McDonald’s about thirty to forty feet away.107 As
the police were conducting the stop, the plaintiff filmed them and unleashed a
torrent of profanity, such as “Mother F***ers,” “F***ing pigs,” and “Leave her the
f*** alone.” 108 The plaintiff then approached within ten to fifteen feet of the
officers, causing one of the officers to ask whether the plaintiff was interfering with
his investigation. 109 The officers then arrested the plaintiff for interfering with
their official duties.110
Another similar incident that occurred involved one of the same plaintiffs, who
saw an officer conducting a sobriety checkpoint. 111 This time, the plaintiff
approached the officer, once again filming the police activity.112 The officer warned
the plaintiff not to come closer and interfere with a police investigation.113 During
the course of the interaction, the plaintiff yelled the following profanities at the
officers: “‘oppressive, sick a ** holes,’ ‘jack-booted thugs,’ ‘Gestapo,’ ‘pieces of sh*t,’
‘sick, oppressive a ** holes,’ and ‘sick a ** holes,’ among other epithets.”114
The plaintiffs challenged their arrests with a civil rights lawsuit.115 The officers
responded by pleading qualified immunity as a defense.116 The federal district court
ruled in favor of the officers, finding that the police officers were entitled to
qualified immunity because the plaintiffs did not engage in protected speech. 117
Instead, the court determined that the plaintiffs engaged in fighting words.118 The
court explained: “Although the facts regarding the proximity of Plaintiffs to
Defendants and the volume of Plaintiffs’ remarks are controverted, the court
concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiffs' speech was ‘inherently likely to produce
105

Id. at 1197–98, 1201.

106

Id. at 1196.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1197.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id. at 1198.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 1198–99.

114

Id. at 1199.

115

Id. at 1195.

116

Id. at 1199.

117

Id. at 1201–02.

118

Id. at 1201.
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a violent reaction.’” 119 The court emphasized that the plaintiffs “were not only
showing their disapproval of police activity, but also making repeated personal
attacks on the officers.”120
I.

County of Milwaukee v. Kiernan121

John P. Kiernan took his wife to Mitchell International Airport in Wisconsin.122
Kiernan’s wife set off the metal detector as she passed through security.123 Kiernan
yelled at his wife to tell the security personnel that it was because of the screws in
her hip.124 When Kiernan went to assist his wife, he crossed over the red-line tape.125
A security officer told Kiernan to get back across the line, which caused Kiernan to
respond that the officer ought to get back over the line.126 Kiernan allegedly cursed
at the officers and put his hands on one of them.127
The officers issued a citation to Kiernan for disorderly conduct.128 A trial court
found him guilty.129 On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, noting
witness testimony that Kiernan had told a police officer he would “kick [his] ass”
and called him a “son of a bitch.”130 The appeals court reasoned that this language
“clearly falls under the scope of ‘fighting words’ that could have incited a breach of
the peace and have little social value.”131
J.

State v. Ovadal132

Ralph Ovadal was part of a group that protested nudity at Mazomanie Beach in

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

County of Milwaukee v. Kiernan, No. 02-1269, 2002 Wis. App. LEXIS 1994 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov.
5, 2002).

122

Id. at *1–2.

123

Id. at *2.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id. at *3.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. at *6–7.

131

Id. at *7.

132

State v. Ovadal, No. 03-377-CR, 2003 Wis. App. LEXIS 947 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003).
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Dane County, Wisconsin.133 The group generally protested in the beach parking lot
located about a mile and a half from the beach.134 In May 2001, Ovadal and a group
of others were protesting when they saw a woman get out of her car.135 A member
of Ovadal’s group handed her a gospel tract. 136 The woman responded with
profanity.137 The group then formed a semi-circle around the woman and started
yelling at her to repent and called her names such as “whore,” “harlot,” and
“Jezebel.”138
The woman filed a complaint against Ovadal and the police later charged him
with disorderly conduct.139 He pled not guilty and had a bench trial.140 The judge
determined Ovadal was guilty of disorderly conduct.141
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 142 The
appeals court noted that “Ovadal repeatedly shouted at [the woman] that she was a
whore, harlot, and Jezebel” and that “in just over six minutes, he used these terms
over thirty times.” 143 The appeals court concluded, “Ovadal’s statements had
nothing to do with an exposition of ideas. Instead, they were abusive fighting words
and are not protected by the First Amendment.”144
K. State v. C.D.145
A 16-year-old juvenile, known in court papers as “C.D.,” faced juvenile
delinquency charges for disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at a
shopping mall in Tukwila, Washington.146 A mall security guard, who was also a
reserve police officer, heard several individuals yelling and saw C.D. on a bench

133

Id. at *1–2.

134

Id. at *2.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id. at *2, *5.

139

Id. at *3.

140

Id. at *3.

141

Id. at *3.

142

Id. at *1.

143

Id. at *8.

144

Id. at *8-9.

145

State v. C.D., No. 018011911, 2002 WL 450467 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2002).

146

Id. at *1.
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yelling at four other individuals. 147 C.D. then called the officer “a nigger” and
exhibited an aggressive demeanor.148 He also asked the officer “what the fuck are
you doing” and called him “boy.”149
The officer smelled alcohol on C.D.’s breath and asked him repeatedly to leave
the mall.150 C.D. approached the officer with clenched fists, causing the officer to
push C.D.151 The officer, then accompanied by another security officer, took C.D.
into custody.152 The mall guards then called the police.153 In the mall security office,
C.D. continued to be loud and argumentative.154 He was charged with disorderly
conduct and a minor in possession.155
A juvenile court adjudicated C.D. delinquent on both charges.156 On appeal, the
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication. 157 The appeals court
emphasized that context was key in determining whether the speech constituted
fighting words.158 The appeals court also noted that C.D.’s language caused the mall
security guard to push him.159 The court wrote, “Fighting words are no less offensive
because they engender only the fear of violence and the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.”160 The appeals court also emphasized that C.D. had
clenched his fists and uttered racial slurs.161
L. State v. Deloreto162
On June 9, 2000, Dante Deloreto was driving in his vehicle when he passed a
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jogger who he knew was a police officer.163 He called the officer “an asshole” and
flipped the officer off.164 He also told the officer, “Faggot, pig, I’ll kick your ass.”165
Deloreto said he had a problem with the officer and others, who he had sued in a
federal lawsuit.166 Deloreto then opened the door and jumped out of the car and
yelled, “I’m going to kick your ass.”167
A second incident occurred between Deloreto and another officer six days later
at a convenience store.168 Deloreto approached the officer and raised his fist.169 He
told the officer, “I’ll kick your ass, punk” several times.170 The officer did not arrest
him on the spot, preferring to let the situation de-escalate.171
Later, authorities charged Deloreto with two counts of breach of the peace for
the two incidents.172 The Connecticut Superior Court wrote:
The language used by the defendant in both incidents which threatened violence
against the police officers, together with the threatening gestures by the defendant of
raising and pumping his fist, were sufficient to support an inference that the defendant
wished to provoke the policemen to violence, thereby removing his words and actions
from first amendment protection.173

M. In Re S.J.N-K174
The South Dakota Supreme Court found that a juvenile committed disorderly
conduct when he—in a car driven by his brother—flipped off and repeatedly yelled
“fuck you” to his middle-school principal.175 The court emphasized that the juvenile
unleashed a torrent of profanity and repeatedly made the profane gesture: “This was
not merely the use of one profane word or one obscene gesture, it was an ongoing
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aggression that falls outside free speech protection.”176
N. In Re John M.177
The Arizona Court of Appeals sustained a juvenile court’s delinquency
adjudication for disturbing the peace when the juvenile yelled a racial slur at an
African-American female and threw a soda can at her.178 The Arizona appeals court
determined that the racial slur—the use of the N-word—was so inflammatory that
it constituted fighting words.179 The appeals court explained: “We agree with the
State that few words convey such an inflammatory message of racial hatred and
bigotry as the term ‘nigger.’”180 The court also characterized the juvenile’s speech as
“an unprovoked, personal attack on an innocent bystander.”181
I I . WH A T F A C T O R S C A N L E A D A C O U R T T O F I N D T H AT S P E E C H I S
F I G H T I N G WOR D S ?

A. Aggressive Conduct In Addition to Speech
If the defendant engages in aggressive conduct in addition to profane or
intemperate speech, a reviewing court may focus on the conduct alone or consider
the speech in conjunction with the unprotected conduct. This implicates an
important doctrine in First Amendment law—sometimes referred to as the speechconduct dichotomy. 182 Under this doctrine, there is a significant difference
between protected speech and unprotected conduct.183 However, the doctrine is
disfavored by First Amendment scholars because oftentimes activity involves both
speech and conduct and to try to combine the two can undervalue speech.184
The reality is that in a fighting words case, the government often will focus on
the aggressive conduct, while the individual will assert that he or she engaged in
pure speech. Take the example of spitting—if a defendant curses at an officer and
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spits at the officer, a reviewing court is far more likely to find that the defendant
engaged in disorderly conduct.185
The conduct could be waving one’s hands, clenching one’s fists, or anything
categorized as “hostile or threatening” conduct. Recall the case of C.D. v. State,
where the slur-uttering juvenile also had his fists clenched as he cursed at the mall
security guard. 186 In State v. Deloreto, the court emphasized that alongside the
profanity, the defendant had engaged in “threatening gestures” of “raising and
pumping his fist” when approaching the officer.187 Similarly, in State v. Harvey, the
Ohio Court of Appeals focused on Mr. Harvey’s “hostile or threatening” conduct in
finding that his speech was fighting words. 188 Furthermore, Mr. Harvey
approached the police in “an aggressive and agitated manner.”189
B. Volume of the Speech
The louder the speech, the more likely that a court may use that fact to support
a disorderly conduct conviction based on the fighting words doctrine. In State v.
Hale, the Ohio Court of Appeals emphasized the witness testimony that Mr. Hale
was “very loud” when he uttered his profanities.190 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
also emphasized the “extreme volume” of Mr. Krueger, the man who repeatedly
cursed at his sister-in-law, in upholding his disorderly conduct conviction.191
C. Repeated Profanities
Profanity generally is protected speech under First Amendment
jurisprudence.192 However, the sheer number and intensity of the profanities may
cause a reviewing court to find that the intemperate speech crosses the line into
unprotected fighting words. Recall that in State v. Hale, the off-duty sheriff’s deputy

185

See State v. York, 732 A.2d 859, 860 (Me. 1999) (noting that “Defendant's conduct included not
just speech, but also the physical acts of declining obstreperously to leave the building . . . and
attempting to spit [on the recipient].”

186

State v. C.D., No. 018011911, 2002 WL 450467 at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2002).

187

State v. Deloreto, No. CR000190119S, 2002 WL 316991 at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2002).

188

State v. Harvey, No. 9-19-34, 2020 WL 525933 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2020).

189

Id. at *7.

190

State v. Hale, 110 N.E.3d 890, 893 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

191

State v. Krueger, No. 14-CR-16-1342, 2017 WL 6418219 at *1, *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018).

192

See David L. Hudson, Jr., Anti-Profanity Laws and the First Amendment, 42 T.
Marshall L. Rev. 203, 203 (2018) (“Profanity generally should be protected by the First
Amendment.”).

18

THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE

was found to have engaged in fighting words when he repeatedly cursed at a local
police officer in a convenience store.193 Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
upheld Mr. Ovadal’s disorderly conduct conviction in part because he called his
victim “whore,” “harlot,” and “Jezebel” thirty times in about six minutes. 194 The
South Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that a juvenile engaged in an “ongoing
aggression” of repeated profanities.195 The federal district court in Kansas in the
McCormick case listed all of the various profanities uttered by the plaintiffs and
emphasized the “repeated personal attacks” the plaintiffs made against the police
officers.196
D. Recipient of the Communication
The recipient of the communication matters in many fighting words cases.
Many courts do follow the principle that Justice Powell advocated in his concurring
opinion in Lewis v. New Orleans—that police officers are expected to exercise
greater restraint when confronted with hostile words.197
But if the recipient of the hostile expression is not a police officer, a court is
more likely to find that the speech constitutes fighting words. For example, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals emphasized that store clerks—unlike police officers—
should not be expected to “tolerate the same level of abuse.”198 Furthermore, courts
are seemingly more willing to find that a defendant engaged in fighting words
when the recipient is someone with whom the defendant has a familial relationship,
as opposed to law enforcement.199
E. Racial slurs—especially the “N-word”
Racial slurs can constitute fighting words.200 Scholar William C. Nevin explains
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that sometimes courts hold racial slurs to be protected speech, sometimes they hold
them to be fighting words, and sometimes racial slurs are fighting words depending
on the specific context.201
Of all the racial slurs, the N-word carries the most significance in fighting
words cases. Harvard Law Professor Randall Kennedy has explained the special
nature of the N-word in American law and society.202 Kennedy, in an earlier piece
of scholarship, explains:
Any person in the United States should be aware of the N-word. Ignorance could be very
costly. Failing to recognize it as the signal of danger that it often is could well lead to
injury, just as using it unaware of its effects and consequences could well cost a person
his reputation, his job, or even his life.203

The N-word represents the ultimate fighting word. In the words of one scholar,
“it carries the force of generations of racial tyranny.” 204 The North Carolina
Supreme Court accurately wrote years ago: “No fact is more generally known than
that a white man who calls a black man ‘a nigger’ within his hearing will hurt and
anger the black man, and often provoke him to confront the white man and
retaliate.”205 In many juvenile adjudication cases, courts have affirmed the finding
of delinquency for those juveniles who uttered the N-word at their victims.206
I I I . C ON C L U S I ON

The fighting words doctrine remains a vibrant and controversial part of First
Amendment law. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not affirmed a fighting words
conviction since that of Walter Chaplinsky’s in 1942, the doctrine remains alive and
well in the lower courts. Courts that affirm a disorderly conduct or breach of the
peace conviction are more likely to emphasize a defendant’s aggressive conduct, a
defendant’s loud volume, the repeated profanities of the defendant, the reaction of
the recipient of the communication, and noxious racial slurs.
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